**1nc**

**1st Off Brazil CP**

**Text: the United States federal government ought to enter into prior, binding consultation with the federative republic of Brazil on whether the United States ought to increase nanotechnology assistance with mexicoThe United States federal government will propose and advocate increase nanotechnology assistance with mexicoThe) during the consultation process. The United States federal government will adopt the result of the consultation. Well Clarify.**

**Binding consultation with Brazil key to US-Brazil relations**

Luigi R. **Einuadi**, March **2011**, ambassador, distinguished fellow at the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, and the National Defense University. Member for the Advisory Council of the Brazil Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Brazil and the United States: The Need for Strategic Engagement”, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docupload/SF%20266%20Einaudi.pdf>

**A prerequisite for improved mutual engagement will** ¶ **be changes in perspective on both sides.** Mutually beneficial engagement requires the United States to welcome Brazil’s emergence as a global power. Brazil is more than ¶ a tropical China35; it is culturally and politically close to ¶ the United States and Europe. Brazil, in turn, needs to ¶ realize that the United States accepts its rise. Brazil also ¶ needs to recognize that the United States still matters ¶ greatly to Brasilia and that more can be achieved working with Washington than against it.¶ The United States and Brazil have vast overlapping interests, but a formal strategic partnership is probably out of ¶ the question for both countries. In the United States, Brazil ¶ must compete for policy attention with China, India, Russia, Japan, Mexico, and several European countries. It poses ¶ no security threat to the United States. Moreover, despite ¶ Brazil’s importance in multilateral organizations, particularly the UN, Brazil can be of limited practical assistance ¶ at best to the United States in its two current wars. Brazil’s ¶ interests, in turn, may be fairly said to include the need to ¶ distinguish itself from the United States. Diplomatically, ¶ this means neither country can expect automatic agreement ¶ from the other. Interests differ **and** it may be politically necessary to highlight differences even when interests are similar. **But both countries should make every effort to develop a ¶ habit of “permanent consultation” in an effort to coordinate ¶ policies, work pragmatically together where interests are ¶ common, and reduce surprises even while recognizing that ¶ specific interests and policies often may differ.¶** **A first operational step, therefore, is for both countries to hold regular policy-level consultations, increase** ¶ **exchanges of information, and coordinate carefully on** ¶ **multilateral matters.** This is much easier said than done. ¶ **The list of global issues on which Brazil is becoming a** ¶ **major player includes conflict resolution, all aspects of** ¶ **energy, including nuclear matters, all types of trade, the** ¶ **environment, space, and the development of international law, including law of the seas and nonproliferation.** To ¶ share information and ensure effective consultation on so ¶ many functional issues will require finding ways to lessen ¶ the geographic stovepiping natural to bureaucracy. The ¶ U.S. Department of State, for example, has historically ¶ organized itself into geographical bureaus responsible ¶ for relations with countries in particular regions, leaving functional issues to offices organized globally. This organization hampers the exchange of information and consultation with countries such as Brazil, whose reach and ¶ policies go beyond their particular geographic region. ¶ One result is that multilateral affairs are still often an ¶ isolated afterthought in the U.S. Government. Are there ¶ things the United States and Brazil could do, whether bilaterally or in the World Trade Organization, that would ¶ offset some of the negative effects of the China trade on ¶ manufacturing in both their countries?36 Just posing the ¶ question reveals the complexity of the task.

**Relations key to Amazon preservation**

**US Department of State,** 6/26/20**03**, “Environmental Cooperation Between the United States and Brazil,” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/21986.htm

The United States and Brazil enjoy a long, rich history of environmental cooperation ranging from management of parks to technical cooperation on forests, remote sensing, and fire science. We hope to make that relationship even stronger in the coming years. We look forward to discussing our many bilateral environmental interests during a high-level Common Agenda on the Environment meeting later this year in Brasilia, and to further strengthening our already strong partnership to protect and manage important natural resources. The U.S. and Brazil plan to encourage the use of renewable energy and energy efficiency through workshops, information exchanges, technical assistance, and training. Our recent bilateral energy discussions helped strengthen our joint commitment to clean energy efforts, while a new energy strategy developed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) holds the potential for additional bilateral collaboration with NGOs and the private sector. Working together, we have installed hybrid-renewable village power systems in the Amazon, and we are beginning to build partnerships with universities to look at biomass resources and develop markets for clean energy. Officials of the state of São Paulo are working with the U.S. to promote technologies that can mitigate local air quality problems and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The U.S. and Brazil hope to collaborate closely to promote sustainable forest management, particularly in the area of reduced impact logging. USAID partners look forward to working with Brazil to develop forest management tracking technologies involving fire-detecting satellites operated by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Global Positioning Systems (GPS) for forest management, modeling of logging damage in disturbed forests, and Landsat-based maps reflecting compliance with Brazil's Forest Code. A consortium of Brazil-based institutions, together with USAID and the U.S. Forest Service, have created a new "Natural Ecosystems Sustained" program for forest management in Brazil that includes marketing of environmental goods and services and landscape-level planning and policy. Brazil and the U.S. now coordinate closely on initiatives such as satellite technology to detect forest fires. Conservation of migratory birds is another key issue for cooperation. The U.S. looks forward to working with Brazil, and more broadly with the region, in a workshop this October to begin developing a framework for a Western Hemisphere strategy to conserve migratory birds - a response to the Summit of the Americas in 2001. Recognizing Brazil's critical role in regional environmental issues across South America, the U.S. Department of State established one of the first of twelve regional environmental "Hub" offices around the world at the U.S. Embassy in Brasilia in 1999.

**Extinction**

**Takacs 96** (David, Philosophies of Paradise, The Johns Hopkins Univ. Pr., Baltimore)

"Habitat destruction and conversion are eliminating species at such a frightening pace that extinction of many contemporary species and the systems they live in and support ... may lead to ecological disaster and severe alteration of the evolutionary process," Terry Erwin writes." And E. 0. Wilson notes: "The question I am asked most frequently about the diversity of life: if enough species are extinguished, will the ecosystem collapse, and will the extinction of most other species follow soon afterward? The only answer anyone can give is: possibly. By the time we find out, however, it might be too late. One planet, one experiment."" So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value in and for itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we play **Russian roulette with global ecology and human futures**: "It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the **Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes** in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on **stable climate**, and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the **extinction** of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which **a billion human beings perished**. And if our species is very unlucky, the famines could **lead to a thermonuclear war**, which could **extinguish civilization.""**

**2nd Off K**

**The affirmative represents “war” as a singular, bounded event. This distinction between “war” and “peace” ensures the continuation of everyday militarism and violence, turning the case.**

Chris J. **Cuomo**, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cincinnati, **1996** (“War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence,” *Hypatia*, Volume 11, Number 4, Fall, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 30-31)

Philosophical attention to war has typically appeared in the form of justifications for entering into war, and over appropriate activities within war. **The spatial metaphors used to refer to war as a separate, bounded sphere indicate assumptions that war is a realm of human activity vastly removed from normal life, or a sort of happening that is appropriately conceived apart from everyday events in peaceful times. Not surprisingly, most discussions of the political and ethical dimensions of war discuss war solely as an event—an occurrence, or collection of occurrences, having clear beginnings and endings that are typically marked by formal, institutional declarations. As happenings, wars and military activities can be seen as motivated by identifiable, if complex, intentions, and directly enacted by individual and collective decision-makers and agents of states. But many of the questions about war** that are of interest to feminists---including how large-scale, state-sponsored violence affects women and members of other oppressed groups; how military violence shapes gendered, raced, and nationalistic political realities and moral imaginations; what such violence consists of and why it persists; how it is related to other oppressive and violent institutions and hegemonies—**cannot be adequately pursued by focusing on events. These issues are not merely a matter of good or bad intentions and identifiable decisions**. In "Gender and 'Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as a presence (Schott 1995). Schott argues that **postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, render an event-based conception of war inadequate**, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that **accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and** therefore feminist **consideration of the political, ethical, and ontological dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach**. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances.1 **Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment**. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because **military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and** because they **justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems**.

**This representation of “war” as an isolated event leads to politics of crisis-control. Every singular “war” the affirmative hopes to prevent will just reappear over and over again**

Chris J. **Cuomo**, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cincinnati, **1996** (“War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence,” *Hypatia*, Volume 11, Number 4, Fall, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 31-32)

**Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state**. **Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance**. For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. **It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war."** Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns.

**The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s problem-solving approach in favor of a critical interrogation of peace.**

Oliver P. **Richmond**, Professor of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, **2007** (“Critical Research Agendas for Peace: The Missing Link in the Study of International Relations,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Volume 32, Issue 2, April-June, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Political Science Complete, p. 250-251)

Though there are many different terms for war in the English language, peace remains a sole denominator.17 Though it may be subject to multiple interpretations, these are rarely made explicit even beyond orthodox approaches to IR. Though critical versions of peace research, conflict studies, development studies, cultural studies, other related areas, and IR are now implicitly converging on a disparate notion of emancipation as a prerequisite for peace, only peace research really entails an explicit conception of peace as being either negative or positive in character as a focus for its research and normative agendas. One of the problems that soon becomes apparent in any discussion of peace is the concept’s tendency to slip into either a universal and/or idealistic form, or to collapse under the weight of its own ontological subjectivity. For this reason, **a historical narrative of peace is fraught with difficulty and orthodox approaches to IR are forced to retreat behind rational problem-solving approaches to order**, albeit self-interested and unashamedly rooted in a specific context, **which are then projected globally on the basis of a claimed universalism**. As a consequence **what has emerged has been an orthodox assumption that first the management of war must be achieved before the institutions of peace can operate**, at a global, regional, state, and local level. **Peace has**, in Western political thought in particular, **been enshrined first in the belief that only a limited peace is possible**, even despite more utopian leanings, **and** recently **that peace can now be built according to a certain epistemology. Militarization, force, or coercion have normally been the key mechanisms for its attainment, and it has been imbued with a hegemonic understanding of universal norms**, now increasingly instilled through institutions of governance. **It is generally assumed** by most theorists, most policymakers, and practitioners, **that peace has an ontological stability enabling it to be understood, defined, and thus created**. Indeed, **the implication of the void of debate about peace indicates that it is generally thought that peace as a concept is so ontologically solid that no debate is required. There is clearly a resistance to examining the** [end page 250] **concept of peace as a subjective ontology, as well as a subjective political and ideological framework**. Indeed, this might be said to be indicative of “orientalism,” in impeding a discussion of a positive peace or of alternative concepts and contexts of peace.18 Indeed, Said’s humanism indicates the dangers of assuming that peace is universal, a Platonic ideal form, or extremely limited. **An emerging critical conceptualization of peace rests upon a genealogy that illustrates its contested discourses and multiple concepts. This allows for an understanding of the many actors, contexts, and dynamics of peace, and enables a reprioritization of what, for whom, and why, peace is valued. Peace from this perspective is a rich, varied, and fluid tapestry, which can be contextualized, rather than a sterile, extremely limited, and probably unobtainable product** of a secular or nonsecular imagination. **It represents a discursive framework in which the many problems that are replicated by the linear and rational project of a universal peace** (**effectively camouflaged by a lack of attention within IR**) **can be properly interrogated in order to prevent the discursive replication of violence**.19 **This allows for an understanding of how the multiple and competing versions of peace may even give rise to conflict, and also how this might be overcome**. One area of consensus from within this more radical literature appears to be that peace is discussed, interpreted, and referred to in a way that nearly always disguises the fact that it is essentially contested. This is often an act of hegemony thinly disguised as benevolence, assertiveness, or wisdom. Indeed, many assertions about peace depend upon actors who know peace then creating it for those that do not, either through their acts or through the implicit peace discourses that are employed to describe conflict and war in opposition to peace. **Where there should be research agendas there are often silences**. Even contemporary approaches in conflict analysis and peace studies rarely stop to imagine the kind of peace they may actually create. **IR has reproduced a science of peace based upon political, social, economic, cultural, and legal governance frameworks**, by which conflict in the world is judged. This has led to **the liberal peace framework**, which **masks a hegemonic collusion over the discourses of, and creation of, peace**.20 **A critical interrogation of peace indicates it should be qualified as a specific type among many**.

**3rd Off T**

**Interpretation “Its” refers to the United States Federal Government and is possessive**

**Updegrave 91** (W.C., “Explanation of ZIP Code Address Purpose”, 8-19, <http://www.supremelaw.org/ref/zipcode/updegrav.htm>)

More specifically, looking at the map on page 11 of the National ZIP Code Directory, e.g. at a local post office, one will see that the first digit of a ZIP Code defines an area that includes more than one State. The first sentence of the explanatory paragraph begins: "A ZIP Code is a numerical code that identifies areas within the United States and its territories for purposes of ..." [cf. 26 CFR 1.1-1(c)]. **Note the singular possessive pronoun "its", not "their", therefore carrying the implication that it relates to the "U**nited **S**tates" **as a corporation domiciled in the District of Columbia (in the singular sense), not in the sense of being the 50 States of the Union (in the plural sense).** The map shows all the States of the Union, but it also shows D.C., Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, making the explanatory statement literally correct.

**Grammatically, this refers solely to U.S. investment**

**Manderino 73** (Justice – Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, “Sigal, Appellant, v. Manufacturers Light and Heat Co”., No. 26, Jan. T., 1972, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 450 Pa. 228; 299 A.2d 646; 1973 Pa. LEXIS 600; 44 Oil & Gas Rep. 214, Lexis)

On its face, the written instrument granting easement rights in this case is ambiguous. The same sentence which refers to the right to lay a 14 inch pipeline (singular) has a later reference to "said lines" (plural). The use of the plural "lines" makes no sense because the only previous reference has been to a "line" (singular). The writing is additionally ambiguous because other key words which are "also may change the size of its pipes" are dangling in that the possessive pronoun "its" before the word "pipes" does not have any subject preceding, to which the possessive pronoun refers. The dangling phrase is the beginning of a sentence, the first word of which does not begin with a capital letter as is customary in normal English [\*\*\*10]  usage. Immediately preceding the "sentence" which does not begin with a capital letter, there appears a dangling  [\*236]  semicolon which makes no sense at the beginning of a sentence and can hardly relate to the preceding sentence which is already properly punctuated by a closing period. The above deviations from accepted grammatical usage **make difficult, if not impossible, a clear understanding** of the words used or the intention of the parties. This is particularly true concerning the meaning of a disputed phrase in the instrument which states that the grantee is to pay damages from ". . . the relaying, maintaining and operating said pipeline. . . ." The instrument is ambiguous as to what the words ". . . relaying . . . said pipeline . . ." were intended to mean.

**Violation- the aff is not referring to the USFG and ITS actions or investment the aff is only using methods that are linked to the government**

**Limits- the aff skews limits anything that is vaguly linked to the government is now topical and that overburdens the neg research burden, making it impossible to prep for the neg**

**Ground- the aff can spike out of any of the links that we present before them like politics links, we lose some actor counterplans, funding counterplans, conditions counterplans, and consult counterplans, also kritiks of diplomacy. The aff makes it impossible to debate**

**4th Off States CP**

**Text – In an appropriate test case, the United States Supreme Court should issue a narrow ruling that federal authority over increase nanotechnology assistance with Mexico. The states’ legislative functions in violation of the 10th and 11th Amendments. The Supreme Court should devolve authority of this narrow ruling to the State Governments and United States Territories. The 50 States and relevant U.S. territories should increase nanotechnology assistance with Mexico.**

**B. Solvency –**

**The Court can make this ruling and devolve power to the states – it won’t be rolled back**

**Miller ’98** (Mark A., Attorney at Law – Baker Botts LLP, Cleveland State Law Review, Lexis)

The history of the Tenth Amendment is an appropriate starting point in the development of substantive federalism. For a long period of time, the Tenth Amendment operated as nothing more than a plain statement of the obvious that afforded little protection to the states. [249](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n249" \t "_self) In the aftermath of Garcia, state sovereignty was left to the political processes. [250](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n250" \t "_self) Tenth Amendment power was reborn in New York v. United States when the Court held that Congress could not commandeer the states' legislative function. [251](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n251" \t "_self) This protection is decreed no matter how strong the federal interest in the legislation may be. [252](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n252" \t "_self) Protections over state sovereignty were expanded again in the 1996 Term when the Court invalidated certain portions of the Brady Act. [253](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n253" \t "_self) According to Printz, Congress cannot force the states' executive branches to enact federal regulatory programs regardless of the federal interest involved. [254](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n254" \t "_self) Whenever the structural framework of dual sovereignty is compromised, the Tenth Amendment steps in to prevent a usurpation of federalism. [255](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n255" \t "_self) Printz and New York held that Congress was incapable of commanding the states to take a course of action that it could not undertake directly. [256](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n256" \t "_self) But what happens if Congress breaches the Tenth Amendment through an Article I power like the Spending Clause? Do the Court's enunciated protections extend to Article I? These are the questions that the theory of substantive federalism answers. The restraint on Article I began, to large extent, in Garcia when Justice O'Connor predicted that the Commerce power would be affirmatively limited  [\*191]  by state autonomy. [257](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n257" \t "_self) The door was further opened in New York when the plenary nature of the Commerce Clause was labeled as "subversive" to the interests of state sovereignty. [258](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n258" \t "_self) United States v. Lopez put the first nail in the coffin when it struck down an exercise of the Commerce power as going so far as to approach a "police power of the sort retained by the States." [259](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n259" \t "_self) The Commerce Clause, in other words, authorizes control over interstate commerce, but does not authorize regulation of the states. [260](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n260" \t "_self) Seminole Tribe, however, lends the greatest support to the substantive federalism theory. The Eleventh Amendment -- a core guardian of state sovereign interests [261](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n261" \t "_self) -- withstands any attempt by Congress to pierce the shield of federalism with Article I.

**Commitment to federalism is critical to global democratic success**

**Broder 01** (David Broder, Washington Post, June 24, 2001, “Lessons On Freedom”)

**Even more persistent were the questions about the role the U**nited **S**tates **would play, under this new administration, in supporting democratic movements around the world.** It is sobering to be reminded how often, during the long decades of the Cold War, this country backed (and in some cases, created) undemocratic regimes, simply because we thought military rulers and other autocrats were more reliable allies against communism. The week of the Salzburg Seminar coincided with President Bush's first tour of Europe. He was a target of jokes and ridicule for many of the fellows as the week began. But the coverage of his meetings and, especially, his major address in Poland on his vision of Europe's future and America's role in it, earned him grudging respect, even though it remains uncertain how high a priority human rights and promotion of democracy will have in the Bush foreign policy. Another great lesson for an American reporter is that **the struggle to maintain the legitimacy of representative government in the eyes of the public is a worldwide battle.** Election turnouts are dropping in almost all the established democracies, so much so that seminar participants seriously discussed the advisability of compulsory voting, before most of them rejected it as smacking too much of authoritarian regimes. Political parties -- which most of us have regarded as essential agents of democracy -- are in decline everywhere. They are viewed by more and more of the national publics as being tied to special interests or locked in increasingly irrelevant or petty rivalries -- anything but effective instruments for tackling current challenges. One large but unresolved question throughout the week: Can you organize and sustain representative government without strong parties? The single most impressive visitor to the seminar was Vaira Vike-Freiberga, the president of Latvia, a woman of Thatcherite determination when it comes to pressing for her country's admission to NATO, but a democrat who has gone through exile four times in her quest for freedom. She is a member of no party, chosen unanimously by a parliament of eight parties, and bolstered by her popular support. But how many such leaders are there? Meantime, even as democracy is tested everywhere from Venezuela to Romania to the Philippines, a new and perhaps tougher accountability examination awaits in the supranational organizations. The European Union has operated so far with a strong council, where each nation has a veto, and a weak parliament, with majority rule. But with its membership seemingly certain to expand, **the age-old dilemma of democracy – majority rule vs. minority and individual rights – is bound to come to the fore. The principle of federalism will be vital to its success.** And, **once again, the U**nited **S**tates **has important lessons to teach. But only if we can keep democracy strong and vital in our own country.**

**Extinction**

**Diamond, 95** — Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution (Larry, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s”, December 1995, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm)

OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional **threats** to security **are associated with** or aggravated by the weakness or **absence of democracy**, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. **Countries that govern** themselves **in a** truly **democratic fashion do not go to war** with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not buildweapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

**5th Off Russia DA**

**Russia’s returning its focus to latin America ---- the plan stops their extended influence**

**Sudarev ‘12** – Professor of American Countries’ History and Politics (Vladimir Sudarey, Doctor of Political Science, Professor of the European and American Countries’ History and Politics Department of the MGIMO University, “" Is Russia returning to Latin America?"” February 20, 2012, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id\_4=252#top)

**Latin American region has recently been often mentioned among new priority dimensions of Russian foreign policy**. Despite the difficulties of both objective and subjective nature, the comeback of Russia to Latin America can provide it with new reliable partners and strengthen its position in a nascent multi-polar world. **The nineties can be regarded as lost years for Russian policy in Latin America**. In fact, Russia didn’t pursue any policy there. Traditionally, as in the Soviet times, this region stood low on the national foreign policy agenda. Of course, there have been undertaken some successful actions – for example, in 1996-1997 Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov paid visits to the region during which the whole **package of agreements on cooperation with Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela**, Argentina, Colombia, and, most importantly, with Brazil (about strategic partnership in the 21 century and creation of a greater Russia-Brazil committee) **were signed.** But these actions were only sporadic, and the signed agreements turned out to be suspended. What is more, it was in the early 1990-s after Russia’s withdrawal from Cuba, with abandoning the construction of about 500 major facilities and decreasing 30-fold trade turnover with this country [1], when West-oriented Russia started to be perceived in Latin America as an unreliable partner. The U-turn in Russian foreign policy after 9/11 contributed to it greatly. Having declared about the readiness of Russia to join the US-sponsored anti-terrorist coalition, President Putin on October 17, 2001 announced the withdrawal of the country from the only overseas strategic site - surveillance radar station in Lurdes on the outskirts of Havana – without prior notification of the Cuban side [2]. Make-or-break moment in the relationships with Latin America region countries occurred in the wake of the Yeltzin era. Latin American countries themselves seem to have contributed a lot to it. Already in 1999 the Rio Group uniting the region’s leading states turned out to be, actually, the only grouping in the world which condemned the bombing of Yugoslavia and pointed out in its declaration specific articles of the UN Charter violated by the NATO member- states [3]. In February 2003 Mexico and Chili as non-permanent UN SC members, in fact, vetoed the second Anglo-American resolution authorizing Iraq intervention, despite their economic dependence on the USA. These actions seem to have made the Kremlin look at the perspectives of cooperation with Latin American countries at a new angle. Thus, in March 2003 President Putin received in Kremlin the delegation of the Rio Group and held official talks with them. Both sides agreed not to confine themselves to regular contacts (launched in 1995) within the framework of the UN General Assembly, but also conduct meetings in Russia and countries of the Group member-states. By mid-decade the exchange of high level delegations between the sides had intensified. Only one example, in November 2008 President Medvedev visited four countries during his tour of the region - Peru, Brazil, Venezuela and Cuba. Commenting on his visit, President **Medvedev remarked**: “…we visited the states which previous Russian leaders had never been to… It means only that **we failed to pay due attention to these countries before, and, to a certain extent, it is only now that we are starting a full-fledged and I hope mutually beneficial cooperation with the heads of these states and between our economies**. он отметил: **We mustn’t be shy and timid and be afraid of competition. We must boldly engage in the battle**”. **In order to display its interest to the presence in the region Russia resorted to a number of un-common and spectacular actions**. In November 2008 a warship squadron with the fleet nuclear-powered cruiser “Peter the Great” of the Russian Navy as a flagship entered the territorial waters of US-hostile Venezuela to participate in joint naval exercises of the North Fleet of the Russian Federation Navy. Simultaneously, within the framework of the resumed patrolling of the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans two Russian long-range strategic bombers landed at a Venezuelan naval base. **The so-called comeback of Russia to Latin America was to a great extent preconditioned by the “leftist drift” in the region which resulted in the emergence of the group of states that viewed the expanding relations with Russia as an important lever for strengthening their position in conflict relations with the USA.** Many of these countries perceived Russia as the successor of the former USSR might and influence, with the vision of a new world order of both sides being practically identical – it should be multilateral, not individually tailored to the interests of a single superpower. This position was set out in numerous joint documents signed at the summits – practically all the leaders of the most prominent Latin American countries paid official visits to Moscow during the first decade of the 21st century. The breakthrough happened also in the military and technical field. Starting from 2004 Venezuela has begun purchases of scale of the Russian arms to the amount of over $4bln. Russia established military and technical cooperation with other countries of the region apart from Venezuela: Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia also procured Russian military hardware. **Russia tried to establish closer economic ties** **with its major partners** **in the region**. At the end of the decade Russia’s oil and gas producing companies LUKOIL and GASPROM were already operating in Venezuela. RUSAL made heavy investments in bauxite industry of Guyana. ROSNEFT got its chunk for oil exploration in Cuban shelf of the Mexican Gulf. **Trade between Russia and the countries of the region has been roaring recently** – over the last decade trade turnover has tripled and amounted to $15bln [4]. However, despite the qualitative changes in the structure of Russian export – the share of machinery and equipment has a little increased – it still leaves much to be desired. Take Brazil, for example: mineral fertilizers have made up 90% of Russian export, while Brazil has been exporting to Russia mostly meat and tropical goods. Largely, Brazil has always been the weakest link of Russia’s regional policy despite its participation in the BRIC group. At any rate, the role of Brazil in Russia’s foreign policy is much smaller than those of China and India. It should be recognized that Russia has failed so far to establish strategic partnership with Brazil, which had been planned for as early as 1997. It can be largely attributed to the fact that Russian leadership has no priority system in interacting with this country. The latter, from our perspective, is explained by poor understanding of how much inter-complimentary could be the interests of the two resource-rich countries in the decades to come. Unfortunately, China, and lately India have been much more economically active in the region than Russia, filling the niches in the market that could have been well filled by Russia. Another question is why Brazilian dimension of Russian foreign policy is much weaker than the Chinese one? Why do we transfer to China, the relationships with which in the 20th century were abundant with conflicts including the armed ones, unique military aircraft building technologies, while denying this to Brazil with which we have never had conflicts or clashes on the international arena? Perhaps, it is the residual principle inherent of the USSR leadership and successfully inherited in 1990-s by the Russian leadership that is applied to this region. But, while the USSR used to have Cuba as a strategic partner, the Russian Federation, having curtailed the ties with the Island of Freedom, didn’t bother to start looking for new partners and paid as little attention to the relations with Brazil as with any other Latin American country. If Russia is really interested in serious and politically influential partners, then it is the Brazil dimension that should be prioritized as the major vector of Russian policy in the region. It means establishing a special system of partnership which will include an overhaul of the current system of trade and economic relations, an introduction of a new system of preferential terms of advanced know-how transfer and exchange, particularly in aerospace field. For that sake it’s necessary to maximally intensify the relations with Brazil’s leadership and take them to a higher level, with the head of state or the government taking control of it. However, the growing understanding of the Russian upper echelons of power of the necessity to shift the focus of economic cooperation with the countries of the region on to scientific and technical sphere arouses certain optimism. It is in the field of advanced technologies where Russia is most competitive, and no wonder that the main emphasis during the April 2010 visit of President Medvedev to the countries of the region was laid on this very issue. Low competitiveness of Russia vis-à-vis other countries undertaking huge efforts with a view to building up their political and economic position in this region continues to persist. Besides, our investment capability is also much lower than that of USA, China, EU and even India. Nonetheless, in spite of the difficulties, both objective and subjective, **the trend of Russia’s presence expansion in the region may gain further momentum in the forthcoming decades,** provided adequate efforts are taken. **In this case Latin American dimension of Russian foreign policy has all chances to make it a separate independent direction which can win Russia new beneficial partners and enhance its position in a nascent multi-polar world**.

**Russian influence key to credible BRIC rise --- solves proxy wars that escalate**

**Ellis ’11** – professor @ Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (Evan Ellis, assistant professor with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS). His research focus is on Latin America’s relationship with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, “Emerging Multi-Power Competitions in Latin America”, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2011/2011-1/2011\_1\_03\_ellis\_eng\_s.pdf)

**Perhaps the lack of a US tradition for relating to the world in terms of multi- power politics is most strongly illustrated in Latin America, where the US has traditionally been the dominant power**. Historically, **where the US has focused on Latin America’s relationships with extra-regional actors, it has been primarily to exclude them, as illustrated by the opposition to 19th century European adventurism in the region, enshrined in the famous Monroe Doctrine, or in the Cold War struggle to prevent the Soviet Union from establishing client states in the region**. **The end of the cold war and the increasing viability of intercontinental economic relationships** in the 1990s **redefined Latin America’s relationship with the US and the world, at the very moment in which the US and its approach to democracy and development seemed most dominant**. Reduced costs associated with the containerization of shipping, new communication and computing technology, and truly global financial markets created opportunities and imperatives for Latin America to participate in commerce with other regions, not only exporting its products, and importing goods from around the world, but also participating in integrated global production chains, attracting foreign capital, and building new ties that begun to undermine the historic pattern in which primarily US-dominated institutions invested in the region, purchased Latin American commodities, and sold Latin America US manufactured goods. In the 1990s, the principal extra-regional actors in Latin America were Europe and Japan, and to a lesser extent, South Korea. Because the new actors were not geopolitical adversaries of the US, and because their ties were principally commercial, the strategic implications of the new dynamic received relatively little attention in the US. Since the early 2000s, however, **as Russia**, Iran, China and India have **also made inroads in the region, US policymakers have registered growing concern**. 2 The **emergence** or re-emergence **of external actors in Latin America such as Russia**, China, India and Iran **represents a new paradigm for the US**, and for the region. On one hand, there has arguably not been a serious competition between multiple outside powers for influence in Latin America since those between the US, Spanish, French, English, and Portuguese, largely ending in the 19 th century. On the other hand, **the strategic imperatives and considerations of the new competition are primarily economic in nature**, rather than ideological or military, as was the case during the Cold War. The purpose of this article is to analyze the dynamics between the emerging new set of external actors in Latin America with an emphasis on identifying the characteristics and dynamics of those interactions, as well as possible opportunities and challenges arising from them. Emerging Multi-Power Competition in Latin America. Multi-power competition in Latin America in the context of globalization differs in many ways from the competition between states that characterized the 15 th Century system of Italian City States that Machiavelli wrote about in The Prince, 3 or the 16 th -19 th Century system of European states. In 21 st Century Latin America, the goals of the actors are different, corresponding to changes in that which has strategic value in the contemporary international system: access to commodities, technology, markets for goods, and certain symbolic and ideological objectives which leaders hope will provide benefits with respect to internal audiences, or in a broader global struggles for position. Moreover, differences in what each external actor in Latin America is looking for and why, create the possibility for complex patterns of cooperation and competition. The interaction between the new actors is driven by two overarching dynamics: (1) On traditional geopolitical issues, a series of coinciding cleavages divide the actors into two camps, with a strategically important shifting middle, depending on the issue. (2) On commercial issues, such as access to markets, sources of supply, and technology, a multi-way competition prevails, with national governments supporting their companies, in pursuit of strategic objectives such as national development or simply regime survival. **The two dynamics are related in ways that depend on the initiative of each actor, since governments use alignment on geopolitical issues to secure commercial objectives, and growing alignment on commercial interests may impact positions on geopolitical issues**. Although there will be various types of violence within, and perhaps between, states in Latin America, it is important to emphasize, that the focus of interaction between states of the region and external actors will be primarily securing an advantage commerce and national development, rather than in war, with competitions for the signing of trade accords, and technology sharing agreements, investment, the granting of privileged access to develop a nation’s mineral and hydrocarbon resources, or who supports whom in multilateral institutions. **It is possible that external powers could become involved in a proxy war, in an attempt to hold up a regime in which they have strategic commercial interests**, but such prospects remain distant at the present time. Coinciding Cleavages on Geopolitical Issues. Traditional geopolitical issues will still tend to divide external actors in Latin America into two camps, although the lineup of actors will change according to the issue. On issues of democratization and human rights, the US and Europe are likely to be generally aligned in advancing an agenda that respects traditional Western norms, while Iran and the PRC, and often Russia, will emphasize the right of each state in the region to determine its own internal politics. India, depending on the specific issue, may or may not press for respect for such norms. Within this broad alignment, of course, differences will still exist, with Europe emphasizing human rights issues in select countries, such as Colombia, where the US does not, or overlooking human rights issues in others, such as Cuba, where the US places emphasis. The pursuit of commercial goals by some actors may motivate them to avoid positions on geopolitical issues that would separate them from potential business partners. **The** second **major cleavage dividing external actors in Latin America is the question of the developed world (North) versus the developing world (South).** Particularly with left-of-center regimes in Latin America, countries such as China, India and Iran emphasize their common “South-South” ties as countries in development, generally in political meetings indirectly pursuing commercial deals for their companies. **Russia often fits uneasily into this coalition, seeking to define itself, in its relations with populist countries such as Venezuela, as an up and coming power (eg. Part of the “BRIC” nations), or as alternative to the status quo powers (the US** and Europe), even though it has not been traditionally categorized as a “developing” nation. Within the political space created by such coinciding cleavages, Latin America also serves as a target for important, but differing internal and international agendas pursued by each actor. For the PRC, Latin America’s principal tie to domestic politics is Taiwan. 12 of the 23 nations in the world which continue to recognize the Republic of China (ROC) as the legitimate Chinese government are found in Latin America. Externally, the PRC also seeks to participate in the region’s institutions, such as the IADB and OAS, and prevent another power such as the US from dominating those institutions, or other regional structures, in such a way that could shut it out of the region and jeopardize its strategic commercial goals. None of other external actors in the region explicitly oppose these goals, but rather, each pursues its own goals in parallel. This include Iran, for which support from Latin America reinforces the international stature of its leadership in the Iranian regime’s messianic efforts to advance its brand of radical Islam with Iran at its center. In a more pragmatic sense, Latin American ties, including financial institutions such as the International Development Bank in Venezuela, direct airline flights, factories in remote areas, and technology collaboration, help Iran to circumvent international sanctions to develop a nuclear capabilities, and possibly fund and create a logistics base for terrorist operations that could reach the United States, in the event that Iran wishes to wage such a conflict in the future. **For Russia**, in a manner similar to Iran, **Latin American ties help the current regime to demonstrate to a domestic audience that Russia is once again playing a significant international role, harkening back to its height of Cold War power as the heart of the Soviet Union**. **Latin America also provides the platform for Russia to generate counter-pressures to US activities** in Eastern Europe, the Caspian sea, and Central Asia, **which Russia regards as its sphere of influence**, such as November 2008, when Russia sent supersonic Tu-160 bombers and a squadron of ships to Venezuela for maneuvers in the Caribbean, as a counterpoint to the US projection of power in the Black Sea during the succession crisis in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. **Because of the shared “anti-western” focus and because the specific geopolitical agendas pursued by actors such as Russia, India and China in Latin America generally complement each other, these nations are not likely to come into conflict over their courtship** of populist regimes such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia. The critical exception to this harmony, however, involves strategic commercial issues, such as which nation gets to develop the preponderance of Venezuela’s petroleum in the Orinoco belt, or the significant deposits of iron and lithium, and perhaps uranium, in Bolivia. Commercial Competition. With respect to commerce, the goals of each external actor are defined by its position within the global economy and other elements of its national situation, as interpreted by its leadership. The PRC, because of its position as a global manufacturer, and because of its aggressive process of capital formation, looks to Latin America as a source of commodities, while its attitude toward markets focuses it on owning key parts of the production chain, or having strong contractual presence there where possible, as evidenced in interest by Chinese companies in Peruvian, Bolivian and Chilean mines, or Venezuelan and Ecuadorian oil fields. China’s combination of a large population and limited agricultural land also drives an interest in Latin America as a source of foodstuffs, particularly in countries with large tracts of land usable for agriculture, such as Brazil and Argentina, which have become significant soy exporters for China. Neither Russia, Iran, nor India have export-led manufacturing sectors which generate a level of demand for commodities similar to that of China. Nonetheless, as the Indian economy continues to grow, its companies will increasingly come into contact with those of China in Latin America as part of their global search for commodities. In the case of **Russia** and Iran, both **have significant petroleum industries which** them to **participate in the petroleum sector of Latin America as part of larger global business strategies**. With respect to Latin American markets, China’s position in the world economy as manufacturer makes its ability to sell its products abroad and move up the value added chain a strategically critical objective, particularly as growth in traditional markets for Chinese exports, such as the US, Europe, and Japan, has slowed. Moreover, the middle-income nature of Latin America’s $3 trillion, 500 million person market, and its sensitivity to price creates particular opportunities as the PRC seeks to gain experience in a range of strategically important sectors such as cars, aircraft, computers, telecommunications, military goods, and space. For similar reasons, Latin America is also an important market for India in select sectors, such as high-end manufactures and technology-intensive goods, laying the basis for an emerging competition in this area. **Russia** also **competes for select segments of the high-end manufacturing market in Latin America, such as military end items and nuclear technology**. Although Iran sells very few goods to Latin America, those purchases are important for its efforts to break free of the international isolation imposed on that country for its pursuit of a nuclear capability. Beyond specific competitions for resources and markets, there are also areas in which the commercial objectives of external actors in Latin America coincide, creating opportunities for future collaboration. All generally benefit, for example, from efficient infrastructure in the region, although they may differ on the focus, with India and China arguably benefitting more than Russia and Iran from improved ports, roads and rail networks oriented toward the Pacific ocean. All generally benefit from respect for contractual and property rights, and predictable legal, regulatory, and political environments in the countries with which they wish to do business, although new entrants, such as China, **Russia**, India, and Iran, also **tend to benefit** initially **from significant changes, since their commercial holdings in these countries have traditionally been eclipsed by US** and European **companies, and changes such as those brought about by Latin American populist movements tend to open up new opportunities**. On the other hand, such **change also opens up potentially destabilizing new competitions between these players to see who will benefit most from the new actors and new rules of the game**. Sectorial Competitions **The currently emerging competitions between external powers in key Latin American business and technology sectors are likely to intensify,** with the possibility for combinations of direct competition and cooperation as the situation dictates, and **with each country leveraging the weight of its government where possible**. The key players, their relative strengths, and their level of engagement will be different in each sector, reflecting the differing situation of each nation, and its companies, in the global economy. **Emerging competitions include those for (1) oil and gas resources, (2) mineral resources, (3) agricultural goods, (4) high-end manufactured goods, (5) military goods, (6) infrastructure projects, and (7) telecom and technology services**.

**BRIC is key to global multilateralism --- solves all impacts – food security, disease, peak oil and global warming**

**Biswas 11** (Aparajita, Professor at the Centre for African Studies at the University of Mumbai, "Foreign Relations of India: BRICS and India, BRICS in Africa," International Affairs, January 6, en.rian.ru/international\_affairs/20110601/164362547.html)

Recently, India’s Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, was in Brazil to attend both the second Summit of **BRIC** and IBSA Summit, held in 2010. For India, these two groups are extremely important, considering that both aim to **collectively boost bargaining power and clout on global issues, and also strengthen economic and political ties among the member-countries on the lines of South-South co-operation**. In fact, India took the initiative to call for improving the importance of **BRIC** and IBSA as groups.(11)Dr. Manmohan Singh **called for closer co-operation in the fields of energy and food security, as well as tapping into the potential of other sectors such as trade and investment, science and technology, and infrastructure**. He added that **pooling together each other’s experiences could lead to more inclusive growth**. "We are four large countries with abundant resources, large populations and diverse societies. We aspire for rapid growth for ourselves and for an external environment that is conducive to our development goals”.(12) **Co-operation on the economic front is one of the focus areas** of India’s policy towards BRIC. It believes that **global challenges can only be addressed by co-operative effort, with the full and equal participation of major and emerging powers and economies**. For India, on the one hand, cooperation with other **BRIC member-states** provides an excellent opportunity to share its development experiences with them as well as learn from their experiences. This is more so since they share common challenges as developing countries and global challenges often affect them in a similar way. In addition to discussions about how to respond to the financial crisis, India **exchanged ideas and experiences on food security, agriculture, disease, foreign aid, energy and global warming**. **Sharing these experiences not only helps the BRIC member-states themselves, it also allows them to share experiences and “best practices” with the developing world and thereby expand South-South cooperation**.

**Laundry list**

No terminal impact da outweigh

**Won’t mutate to kill hosts**

**Understanding evolution 07 –** Website on Evolution from UC Berkeley (December, "Evolution from a virus's view," http://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/news/071201\_adenovirus)

Since transmission is a matter of life or death for pathogen lineages, some evolutionary biologists have focused on this as the key to understanding why some have evolved into killers and others cause no worse than the sniffles. The idea is that there may be an evolutionary trade-off between virulence and transmission. Consider a virus that exploits its human host more than most and so produces more offspring than most. This virus does a lot of damage to the host — in other words, is highly virulent. From the virus's perspective, this would, at first, seem like a good thing; extra resources mean extra offspring, which generally means high evolutionary [fitness](http://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/glossary/glossary_popup.php?word=fitness). However, if the viral reproduction completely incapacitates the host, the whole strategy could backfire: the illness might prevent the host from going out and coming into contact with new hosts that the virus could jump to. A victim of its own success, the viral lineage could go extinct and become an evolutionary dead end. This level of virulence is clearly not a good thing from the virus's perspective.

**Natural immunities means complete extinction impossible**

**Sowell 01** Fellow at Hoover Institution (Thomas, March 5, Jewish World Review, “The Dangers of “Equality”, http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/sowell030501.asp)

People have different vulnerabilities and resistances to a variety of diseases. That is why one disease is unlikely to wipe out the human species, even in one place. An epidemic that sweeps through an area may leave some people dying like flies while others remain as healthy as horses.

**Status quo monitoring, tech, drugs, and policies solve disease spread (specifically avian flu)**

**Youngerman 08 (2008, Barry Youngerman, Facts on File, *Global Issues: Pandemics and Global Health*, p 103-4) HL**

**Yes: given the propensity of the flu virus to mutate, and given the constant growth in international travel, trade, and migration, sooner or later a deadly and contagious influenza virus may well emerge one year and begin to spread from one person to the next and from one region to another. But: the world community is becoming better equipped from year to year to meet such a threat. Better surveillance, international communication, diagnosis, genetic analysis, vaccine production, antiviral development, and antibiotics will probably prevent anything like the terrible toll of 1918. The longer such a threat can be postponed, the better prepared we are likely to be. With regard to the threat of avian flu, in the 10 years since the pathogenic H5N1 virus emerged to infect its first human victims it has failed to develop permanent mutations that would allow it to spread more easily to people. However, this is not entirely a matter of good luck. Several mutations have emerged that are quite worrisome to scientists, but as far as we know, every single person infected with the mutated virus has been isolated and either recovered or died without passing the mutation on. We must be grateful for the swift response of World Health Organization (WHO) teams who encouraged governments to impose quarantines and arrange for the treatment of everyone involved with antivirals. This quick response has denied the mutated viruses the opportunity to mix with human flu viruses to create a super-pathogenic strain, which probably happened sometime before 1918. 152 The world community must continue to be vigilant, however, and proactively help those countries that lack the resources to deal with the issue on their own.**

**Diseases burn out – no spread**

**Morse, 04** (Stephen, PhD, director of the Center for Public Health Preparedness, at the Mailman School of Public Health of Columbia University, May 2004, “Emerging and Reemerging Infectious Diseases: A Global Problem,” http://www.actionbioscience.org/newfrontiers/morse.html, Hensel)

Morse: A pandemic is a very big epidemic. It requires a number of things. There are many infections that get introduced from time to time in the human population and, like Ebola, burn themselves out because they kill too quickly or they don’t have a way to get from person to person. They are a terrible tragedy, but also, in a sense, it is a lucky thing that they don’t have an efficient means of transmission. In some cases, we may inadvertently create pathways to allow transmission of infections that may be poorly transmissible, for example, spreading HIV through needle sharing, the blood supply, and, of course, initially through the commercial sex trade. The disease is not easily transmitted, but we provided, without realizing it, means for it to spread. It is now pandemic in spite of its relatively inefficient transmission. We also get complacent and do not take steps to prevent its spread.

**Water Wars**

**Water disputes happen within countries, and is more likely to lead to cooperation – empirics**

**Brooks and Linton 2K –** Senior Advisor in the Program and Partnership Branch of the International Development Research Centre in Ottawa, and \* freelance writer who specializes in water issues (David B. and Jamie, July 2000, Globe and Mail “Drinking (Water) With Your Enemy”, http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/18677/1/116118.pdf)

As Israelis and Palestinians approach final status talks, water is high on the agenda. As Israelis and Syrians jockey for negotiating room the waters of the Golan and of the Sea of Galilee are points of contention. Yet, tough as these issues are, there is little danger that inter-state conflict will erupt over water. Even in the Middle East, where water is scarcer than anywhere else in the world, **water has served as a greater cause for cooperation than for conflict**. Cooperation not conflict The notion of cooperation over international water resources will strike most readers as anomalous. Have we not all heard that "the wars of the 21 st century will be about water," as World Bank vice president Ismail Serageldin stated a few years ago. Or that water was the only conceivable reason for Jordan to go to war with Israel, as the late King Hussein is alleged to have said. There is, however, very little evidence that disputes over water have led or are about to lead to international conflict. (Nor has anyone been able to document King Hussein's remarks about going to war with Israel over water.) Though some have asserted that Arab-Israeli warfare has been motivated in part by the desire to assert control over water resources, historical evidence shows that water was not a factor in strategic planning by either side during the hostilities of 1948, 1967, 1978, or 1982. Water problems If water wars are unlikely, does this mean that we need not be concerned about conflict over water? Not at all. Worldwide water use went up more than six fold in the 20th century and it continues to grow twice as fast as the increase in population. Problems associated with water scarcity and control over water resources are all too common. However, they are much more likely to occur within countries — such as the competition for water between urban dwellers seeking drinking water and farmers seeking water for irrigation — than between countries. The violence that erupted earlier this year in Cochabamba, Bolivia, following tariff increases for municipal water illustrates the kind of water conflict that we can expect to see. (see Globe and Mail, May 9 and 18, 2000) Experience shows that the presence of water on an international border is more likely to provide a catalyst for cooperation than conflict between the countries that depend on it. Researchers at the University of Oregon have compiled a Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database. In examining the cases generally considered to be examples of international water conflict, they have arrived at a surprising conclusion: Instead of fighting, **countries that share water resources tend to maintain dialogue and negotiation leading to treaties** for joint management of water. Jordan River The Jordan River forms much of the boundary between Israel and Jordan and is one of the world's most hotly contested waterways. Even while these two countries were legally at war, they maintained informal contacts on managing the river. As a result, when the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty was signed in 1994, it was possible to include a well-developed annex devoted "to achieving a comprehensive and lasting settlement of all the water problems between [Israel and Jordan]." What has been true for surface water on an international border also seems to be true for aquifers underlying a border. Prior to the signing of their historic agreement in 1993, Israeli and Palestinian academics and officials began holding discussions on joint management of the Mountain Aquifer, an extremely important source of groundwater underlying both Israel and the West Bank. The success of these discussions has helped forge a climate within which the broader peace process can take place. India-Pakistan collaboration Examples of collaboration over water are not restricted to the Middle East. Despite three wars and numerous skirmishes since 1948, India and Pakistan have managed to negotiate and implement a complex treaty on sharing the waters of the Indus River system. During periods of hostility, neither side has targeted the water facilities of the other nor attempted to disrupt the negotiated arrangements for water management. In Africa too, where eleven countries share the basin of the Nile, cooperation over water is more evident than conflict. "Perhaps the weight of history lies too heavy in the silt of the Nile valley," writes historian Robert Collins, "but man will always need water; and in the end this may drive him to drink with his enemies." Closer to home, the International Joint Commission, which manages waters shared by Canada and the United States, is considered such a model of success that it is being emulated by other nations. Minor skirmishes Approximately 40% of the world's population lives in the 264 river basins shared by more than one country. Put another way, almost half the world's land area is found in international water basins. And yet there have been only seven minor skirmishes over international waters in modern history, and even these involved factors in addition to water. Meanwhile, hundreds of international treaties have been negotiated to deal with water management, about 150 in the past century alone. There is no doubt that humanity faces a worldwide water crisis. Growing demand for drinking water and the much higher demand for irrigation water are placing enormous pressures on available fresh water supplies. At the same time, increasing pollution is reducing the usefulness of available water. The threats that these conditions pose for the poor and for the environment can not be overstated. Nevertheless, it is far more useful to consider the role of water in promoting cooperation rather than conflict, particularly in international relations. As the opening quote suggests, those who are inclined to belligerence may look to water as a reason for fighting. But for most of us, water's greatest value may be the way it brings people together.

**Adaption and tech solves**

**Lawfield 10** – Thomas Lawfield is an MA candidate at the University for Peace. Water Security: War or Peace? Thomas Lawfield May 03, 2010 http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id\_article=715

In reality, water does not cause war. The arguments presented above, although correct in principle, have little purchase in empirical evidence. Indeed, as one author notes, there is only one case of a war where the formal declaration of war was over water.[20] This was an incident between two Mesopotamian city states, Lagash and Umma, over 2,500 years BC, in modern day southern Iraq. Both the initial premises and arguments of water war theorists have been brought into question. Given this, a number of areas of contestation have emerged: "Questioning both the supply and demand side of the water war argument [...] Questioning assumptions about the costs of water resources [...and] Demonstrating the cooperative potential of the water resource."[21] Why then is water not a cause of war? The answer lies in two factors: first, the capacity for adaptation to water stresses and, second, the political drawbacks to coupling water and conflict. First, there is no water crisis, or more correctly, there are a number of adaptation strategies that reduce stress on water resources and so make conflict less likely. Unlike the water war discourse, which perceives water as finite in the Malthusian sense, the capacity for adaptation to water stress has been greatly underestimated. For instance, I will discuss in particular a trading adaptation known as ‘virtual water’, which refers to the water used to grow imported food. This water can be subtracted from the total projected agricultural water needs of a state, and hence allows water scarce states to operate on a lower in-country water requirement than would otherwise be expected.[22] This means that regions of the world that are particularly rich in water produce water intense agricultural products more easily in the global trade system, while other water scarce areas produce low intensity products.[23] The scale of this water is significant - Allan famously pointed out that more embedded water flows into the Middle East in the form of grain than flows in the Nile.[24] In addition, there are significant problems around the hegemonic doctrine of the water crisis. Many authors point to relatively low water provision per capita by states, and suggest that this will increase the likelihood of a state engaging in war with a neighbouring state, to obtain the water necessary for its population. This is normally a conceptual leap that produces the incorrect corollary of conflict, but is also frequently a problem of data weaknesses around the per capita requirements. For instance, Stucki cites the case of the Palestinians being under the worst water stress, with a per capita provision being in the region of 165m³/year.[25] Unfortunately, such an analysis is based on false actual provision data in this region. Based on the authors work on water provision in Lebanese Palestinian refugee camps, the actual provision is over 90m³/month. Such a figure is highly likely to be representative of other camps in the region.[26] If this example is representative of trends to exaggerate water pressures in the region, then we should be sceptical about claims of increasing water stress. Furthermore, given that many water systems have a pipe leakage rate of fifty per cent, combined with a seventy per cent loss of agricultural water, significant efficiency enhancements could be made to existing infrastructure. Combined with desalination options in many water shortage prone states, there is an overall capacity for technological and market driven solutions to water scarcity.[27]

**Their argument is based on faulty social science – humans use resources effectively which breaks resource barrier challenges**

Allouche 11 **–** Institute of Development Studies, UK (Jeremy, January 2011, "The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global tradestar, open," Food Policy, Volume 36, Supplement 1, January 2011, Pages S3-S8, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272>)

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.

**6th Off Asia DA**

**Obama’s primary focus is increased engagement in Asia**

**Palmer 13**

[Douglas. Trade Expert for Politico, Reuters. “President Obama to dive into Pacific trade talks” *Politico*, 9/26/13 ln//]

President Barack **Obama and leaders of 11 other countries are set to get** **directly involved with negotiations over the** [**TPP**] Trans-Pacific Partnership — potentially **the largest trade deal in U.S. history** — when they meet in Bali next month, U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman said on Thursday.¶ “I think we envisage **the leaders will get together and talk about the major outstanding issues** (in the Trans-Pacific Partnership talks) and whether there need to be packages put together to create a balanced outcome,” Froman told reporters at a breakfast hosted by the Christian Science Monitor, in Washington, D.C.¶ **The proposed TPP pact includes the United States, Japan, Canada, Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Peru and Chile**.¶ **It would be the largest U.S. free trade agreement to date, covering nearly 60 percent of the global economy,** and is expected to cover issues not included in previous pacts, such as rules for state-owned enterprises and digital trade.¶ After more than three years of negotiations, the **Obama** administration **is** **pushing to close the agreement by [the end of 2013]** Dec. 31, raising concerns in the business community and Congress about what will, and will not, be in the pact.¶ Froman said **the goal for the meeting** between Obama and other TPP country leaders at the Oct. 7-8 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, in Bali, **would be to reach a** **“political level agreement”** for negotiators to flesh out.¶ Earlier this week, **a bipartisan group of 60 senators urged** Froman and U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew to include “**strong and enforceable” rules against currency manipulation in all future trade agreements**. That followed a similar letter in June signed by 230 members of the House.

**But increased engagement with Latin America trades off**

**Sharpe ‘13**

[Patricia Lee, a US based journalist, teacher and foreign service officer, “The Asian Pivot and Obama’s Gum-Chewing Problem”, <http://whirledview.typepad.com/whirledview/2013/05/the-pivot-and-obamas-gum-chewing-problem.html#sthash.ersSkGID.dpuf> //]

**The President**, it seems, **can’t walk and chew gum**. **The so-called Asian pivot is a case in point**, but not the only one.¶ Is it really possible that a great power with the formal institutional resources available to the U.S. can’t keep an eye on the Middle East and China at the same time? Especially since the China issue massively involves the Navy and the Middle East far less so?¶ Or is this really just a presidential problem? **Does Barack Obama lack the smarts to juggle a complex agenda or, to use the current jargon, to multitask?** Or is he a colossally bad manager? Or lazy? Or more in love with the image than the obligations of being president?¶ Or, truly frightening to contemplate, is the obviously troubled U.S. system we used to admire rotten and corrupted to the point of irremediability?¶ No Lack of People¶ **Look at it this way. There are thousands of thoughtful, well-informed people within the State Department, the National Security Council, the many-pronged intelligence apparatus and the Pentagon to gather information, assess its implications, draw up policy and/or action plans and send them up the hierarchy to be dealt with—collated, evaluated, weighed, tweaked, given relative priorities with appropriate resources—and, passing muster, implemented**. Could we possibly be reduced to this: able to activate only one department of one branch of government at one time?¶ **Seems to me that a well-managed country that pretends to super power status should be able to deal with the Middle East and with China simultaneously—and also, at the same time, with Latin America and Africa as well as all the global issues that affect the welfare of this and other countries.¶** If not, the Republicans are right. Thousands of people should be out of a job because they are redundant, which is a polite way of calling them useless.¶ A Definite Lack of Deft PD¶ Actually, **the apparent inability to multi-task isn’t my only perplexity on the “pivot” front,** and I’d like to exhaust those concerns before I return to the question of whether this government can simultaneously walk and check gum (and, one would hope, also be able to blow big beautiful bubbles—excluding the financial sort, of course).¶ As an old hand at public diplomacy, I deeply do not understand why **the administration so blatantly announced that it was shifting its attention**, i.e., executing a pivot, to the East, **thus implying that the U.S. lacks the resources to handle a full plate of global issues**. Maybe the U.S. isn’t equipped these days to wage a two-front war, but any world power worth the name must have the resources to carry out effective diplomacy on a global scale. Otherwise, it’s not a middling power, much less a super power.

**The impact’s nuclear war**

**Colby ’11**

[Elbridge Colby, research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, served as policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense’s Representative to the New START talks, expert advisor to the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, August 10, 2011, “Why the U.S. Needs its Liberal Empire,” The Diplomat, online: <http://the-diplomat.com/2011/08/10/why-us-needs-its-liberal-empire/2/?print=yes>]

But the pendulum shouldn’t be allowed to swing too far toward an incautious retrenchment. For our problem hasn’t been overseas commitments and interventions as such, but the kinds of interventions. **The US** alliance and partnership structure, what the late William Odom called the United States’ ‘**liberal empire’ that includes** a substantial **military presence and a willingness to use it** in the defence of US and allied interests, **remains avital componentof** US security and **global stability and prosperity**. This system of voluntary and consensual cooperation under **US leadership**, particularly in the security realm, **constitutes a formidable bloc defending the liberal international order**.¶ But, in part due to poor decision-making in Washington, this system is under strain, particularly in East Asia, where the security situation has become tenser even as the region continues to become the centre of the global economy.¶ A nuclear North Korea’s violent behaviour threatens South Korea and Japan, as well as US forces on the peninsula; Pyongyang’s development of a road mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, moreover, brings into sight the day when **North Korea could threaten the U**nited **S**tates itself **with nuclear attack**, a prospect that will further imperil stability in the region.¶ More broadly, **the rise of China** – and especially its rapid and opaque military build-up – combined with its increasing assertiveness in regional disputes **is troubling** to the United States and its allies and partners **across the region**. Particularly relevant to the US military presence in the western Pacific is the development of Beijing’s anti-access and area denial capabilities, including the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, more capable anti-ship cruise missiles, attack submarines, attack aircraft, smart mines, torpedoes, and other assets.¶ While Beijing remains a constructive contributor on a range of matters, these capabilities **will** give China the growing power to deny the United States the ability to operate effectively in the western Pacific, and thus the potential to **undermine the US-guaranteed security substructure** that has defined littoral East Asia since World War II. Even if China says today it won’t exploit this growing capability, who can tell what tomorrow or the next day will bring?¶ Naturally, US efforts to build up forces in the western Pacific in response to future Chinese force improvements must be coupled with efforts to engage Beijing as a responsible stakeholder; indeed, a strengthened but appropriately restrained military posture will enable rather than detract from such engagement. ¶ In short, **the U**nited **S**tates **must increase its involvement in East Asia rather than decrease it**. Simply maintaining the military balance in the western Pacific will, however, involve substantial investments to improve US capabilities. It will also require augmented contributions to the common defence by US allies that have long enjoyed low defence budgets under the US security umbrella. **This won’t be cheap**, for these requirements can’t be met simply by incremental additions to the existing posture, but will have to include advances in air, naval, space, cyber, and other expensive high-tech capabilities.¶ Yet such efforts are vital, for **East Asia represents the economic future, and its strategic developments willdetermine which country** or countries **set the international rulesthat shape that economic future**. Conversely, **US interventionsin the Middle East** and, to a lesser degree, in south-eastern Europe **have been driven by** far more ambitious and **aspirational conceptions of the national interest**, encompassing **the proposition that** failing or **illiberally governed peripheral statescan contribute to an instability** that nurtures terrorism and impedes economic growth. Regardless of whether this proposition is true, **the effort is** rightly seen by the new political tide **not** to be **worth the benefits gained**. Moreover, the United States can scale (and has scaled) back nation-building plans in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans without undermining its vital interests in ensuring the free flow of oil and in preventing terrorism.¶ The lesson to be drawn from recent years is not, then, that the United States should scale back or shun overseas commitments as such, but rather that we must be more discriminating in making and acting upon them. A total US unwillingness to intervene would pull the rug out from under the US-led structure, leaving the international system prey to disorder at the least, and at worst to chaos or dominance by others who could not be counted on to look out for US interests.**¶ We need to focus onmaking the right interventions**, not forswearing them completely. In practice, **this means amore substantial focus on East Asia** and the serious security challenges there, **andless emphasis on the Middle East**. ¶ This isn’t to say that the United States should be unwilling to intervene in the Middle East. Rather, it is to say that our interventions there should be more tightly connected to concrete objectives such as **protecting** the free flow of **oil** from the region, **preventing terrorist attacks** against the United States and its allies, and **forestalling** or, if necessary, containing **nuclear proliferation** as opposed to the more idealistic aspirations to transform the region’s societies. ¶ These more concrete objectives **can bebetter met by** the **more judicious and economical use of our military power**. More broadly, however, **itmeans a shift in US emphasis away from the** greater **Middle East toward the Asia-Pacific** region, **whichdwarfsthe former ineconomic and military potential** and in the dynamism of its societies. **The Asia-Pacific** region, with its hard-charging economies and growing presence on the global stage, **is where the future of the international security and economic system will be set**, and it is there that Washington needs to focus its attention, especially in light of rising regional security challenges. ¶**In light of US budgetary pressures**, including the hundreds of billions in ‘security’ related money to be cut as part of the debt ceiling deal, **it’s** doubly **important** that **US security dollars be allocated to themost pressing tasks** – **shoring up the US position in** the most important region of the world, **the Asia-Pacific**. It **will** also **require restraint in expenditure on those challenges and regions that don’t touch so directly on the future of US security and prosperity**. ¶ As Americans debate the proper US global role in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and Iraq and Afghanistan, they would do well to direct their ire not at overseas commitments and intervention as such, but rather at those not tied to core US interests and the sustainment and adaptation of the ‘liberal empire’ that we have constructed and maintained since World War II.¶ Defenders of our important overseas links and activities should clearly distinguish their cause from the hyperactive and barely restrained approach represented by those who, unsatisfied with seeing the United States tied down in three Middle Eastern countries, seek intervention in yet more, such as Syria. Indeed, **those whorefuse to scale back US interventions in the Middle Eastor call for still more aredirectly contributing to the weakening of US commitments in East Asia**, **given strategic developments in the region and asharply constrained budgetary environment in Washington**.¶**We can no longer afford**, either strategically or **financially, tosquander our power** in unnecessary and ill-advised interventions and nation-building efforts. The ability and will to intervene is too important to be so wasted.